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Justice Bertha Wilson and
the Politics of Feminism
Constance Backhouse*

I. INTRODUCTION
Madam Justice Bertha Wilson’s biographer, Ellen Anderson, was
adamant that the first woman appointed to the Canadian Supreme Court
was not a feminist. Anderson makes the point in her book, Judging
Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as Life, on the second page of the preface,
and no fewer than three additional times in the book, noting that Justice
Wilson “declines to identify herself as a feminist”, does “not consider
herself a feminist”, was “avowedly not a feminist”, and finally that she
“most emphatically does not consider herself a feminist”.1 Interestingly,
none of these statements is a direct quote from Justice Wilson. Anderson
herself is no fan of feminists — whom she describes as “confrontational”
and “fervent” — or indeed of feminism, which she characterizes as given
to “simple-minded dichotomies”, “self-righteous certainty” and
“feminist rant”.2 In a previous publication, I expressed some concern
over whether Anderson’s own anti-feminism impeded her ability to
undertake an accurate assessment of Justice Wilson’s relationship with
feminism.3 It is no longer possible to question Justice Wilson directly
regarding her position on feminism. However, I have since had an
opportunity to speak with Madam Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, who
served on the bench for many years with Justice Wilson, after she
became the second woman appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
*
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University of Ottawa, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Bora
Laskin Human Rights Fellowship, the Jules and Gabrielle Léger Fellowship, the Trudeau
Fellowship and the Law Foundation of Ontario is gratefully acknowledged.
1
Ellen Anderson, Judging Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as Life (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2001), at xiv, 135-36, 197 [hereinafter “Judging Bertha Wilson”].
2
Id., at xvi, 197, 223, 230, 231.
3
Constance Backhouse, book review of Judging Bertha Wilson, supra, note 1, in
Labour/Le Travail, vol. 51 (Spring 2003), at 295-97. See also Clare McGlynn, “Book Review: Ellen
Anderson, Judging Bertha Wilson” (2003) 11 Fem. Legal Stud. 307.
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Justice L’Heureux-Dubé confirmed that Justice Wilson never selfidentified as a feminist.4
The politics of feminism and the self-referential label “feminist”
have long had an uneasy relationship with women in law. I want to use
this forum to begin to reflect upon why individuals such as Justice
Wilson, whose legal and judicial careers stand as such beacons for social
justice advocates, were so reluctant to refer to themselves as feminists. I
also want to question whether Justice Wilson’s apparent choice not to
identify with feminism means that we are estopped from describing her
as a “feminist judge”. I come to this discussion as a self-identified
feminist of many decades, who has been involved as a writer, teacher
and activist with the Canadian feminist movement. While I understand
that feminists are undoubtedly capable of all the things Anderson
accuses us of, the feminism that I and many others aspire to bears little
resemblance to Anderson’s depiction of it. And I remain curious about
Justice Wilson’s apparent uneasiness over the term “feminist”.

II. THE WIDER CONTEXT OF FEMINISM AND LAW
Mary Jane Mossman has noted that the early women lawyers in
Canada were reluctant to call attention to their gender, and insistent on
being treated as lawyers, rather than women lawyers.5 My preliminary
research into the lives and careers of some of Ontario’s early women
lawyers accords with this conclusion.6 Although many experienced
discriminatory treatment from employers, colleagues, clients and judges,
few were prepared to label the behaviour as “sexist”. In informal and
confidential settings, they would recount innumerable incidents where
4

Interview with Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, Ottawa, November 1, 2007.
Mary Jane Mossman, The First Women Lawyers: A Comparative Study of Gender, Law
and the Legal Profession (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2006) [hereinafter “The First
Women Lawyers”] noted, at 21, that women lawyers from earlier generations seem to have preferred
to “eschew connections with the women’s movement in favour of strictly professional identities”.
An example of a woman who was clearly an exception to this generalization was Margaret
Hyndman, whose trail-blazing work on behalf of women distinguished her remarkable legal career.
Even she, however, was reluctant to take on a gendered identity. She was quoted in 1949 in
Maclean’s Magazine in an article titled “The Legal Lady”, at 23: “Only the fact that I am a lawyer
matters. That I am a woman is no consequence.”
6
I have worked most extensively on the career of Clara Brett Martin, Canada’s first
woman lawyer, but my conclusion is also based on informal discussions I have had over the past
decades with some of the senior women lawyers in Ontario. See Constance Backhouse, Petticoats
and Prejudice: Women and Law in Nineteenth-Century Canada (Toronto: Women’s Press, 1991), at
chapter 10.
5
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they had been refused jobs, treated differentially and dismissively by
senior lawyers, colleagues and professional organizations, rejected by
potential clients, and treated as curiosities by judges. Then they would
insist that they had never experienced discrimination based on gender. In
public, they preferred to speak of the men who had offered kindness and
support, and to insist that women could succeed in law as well as men.
It is my sense that the first cohort of women decided that it was
strategically wiser to ignore or discount the negative treatment, because
to dwell on the difficulties would have left them too angry, bitter and
depressed to continue their careers. Framing their experiences through
consciously positive and optimistic philosophies, they chose instead to
focus on instances of affirmative assistance. Perhaps they hoped that by
giving public recognition to such acts and the generous individuals who
were responsible for them, they could inspire others to emulate
egalitarian behaviour. They chose to eschew any detailed analysis of
sexism in law, and to put their energies toward the difficult job of simply
trying to establish a foothold in a male-dominated profession.
Nevertheless, it is equally clear that the early women lawyers
generally espoused a strongly pro-woman perspective. I have come
across none who suggested that women should be subordinate to men,
and none who expressed skepticism about the capacity of women
lawyers to succeed in the profession. To the contrary, these lawyers
seemed committed to heralding and celebrating the full integration of
women in law, although they wished to do so without publicly calling
attention to gender.
There was a noticeable shift after 1970, when a vibrant cohort of
young women came through law school while “second-wave” feminism
was growing and flourishing in the wider Canadian society.7 Prior to
1970, the percentage of women in law had hovered around 5 per cent. In
1970, the number jumped to 12.7 per cent, and by 1985, it had reached
45.7 per cent, in what has been described as “a revolution in numbers”.8
7

For an introduction into the literature regarding the genesis and nature of both first and
second waves of the Canadian women’s movement, see Alison Prentice et al., Canadian Women: A
History (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988). See also the Clio Collective, Quebec Women:
A History (Toronto: Women’s Press, 1987). The release in 1970 of the Report of the Royal
Commission, The Status of Women in Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970) is often taken as
a marker for the commencement of the second wave.
8
The phrase “revolution in numbers” is a quote from Rosalie Abella, as noted in The First
Women Lawyers, supra, note 5, at 10. In 1945, 4.4 per cent of the law students in Canada were
female; in 1960, it rose to 5.1 per cent; in 1970, 12.7 per cent; in 1980, 38.2 per cent; and in 1985,
45.7 per cent. See Statistics Canada, Survey of Higher Education and Universities: Enrolment and
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This numerically unprecedented cohort publicly drew attention to the
multiple gender inequalities facing women in law, and collectively
demanded wide-ranging changes. Not all of the younger women would
have labelled themselves feminists. But the new era brought a certain
“safety in numbers” and many of the women who became lawyers after
1970 recognized that they had the luxury of identifying with feminism
because they were able to offer each other protection and support.9 The
wider explosion of feminist activism that manifested itself simultaneously
in electoral politics, education, the media, the family, health and welfare,
the labour market, sports, and the arts, also made it possible for women
lawyers to bring a fresh perspective to their profession.10
Not surprisingly, some tensions arose between the new selfidentified feminist cohort and the more senior women lawyers who had
preceded them. The younger feminist cohort was insistent that gender
mattered. As students, they took collective action within law schools as
they demanded an end to unequal treatment, and launched public
demonstrations over sexism in the bar admission course. They called
attention to sexual harassment within the profession. They organized
lobby campaigns to force governments to repeal sexist laws, and

Degrees [hereinafter “Survey of Higher Education and Universities”], cited in D.A.A. Stager &
H.W. Arthurs, Lawyers in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), at 96-97 Table 4.3.
9
I have begun to compile some research on a cohort of feminist lawyers who graduated
from law school between 1970 and the early 1990s, whose experiences and demands for change
appear to have been unprecedented in earlier (and possibly subsequent) generations. For some initial
analysis of this research, see Constance Backhouse, A Revolution in Numbers: Ontario Feminist
Lawyers from the 1970s through the 1990s – Part I, Formative Years Through to the Call to the
Bar, unpublished manuscript.
10
For some description of the wider second wave Canadian feminist movement, see
Angela Miles and Geraldine Finn, Feminism in Canada: From Pressure to Politics (Montreal:
Black Rose Books, 1982); Maureen Fitzgerald, Connie Guberman & Margie Wolfe, Still Ain’t
Satisfied: Canadian Feminism Today (Toronto: Women’s Press, 1982); Penney Kome, The Taking
of Twenty-Eight: Women Challenge the Constitution (Toronto: Women’s Press, 1983); Roberta
Hamilton & Michele Barrett, The Politics of Diversity: Feminism, Marxism and Nationalism
(Montreal: Book Center Inc., 1986); Jeri Dawn Wine & Janice L. Ristock, Women and Social
Change: Feminist Activism in Canada (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1988); Nancy Adamson, Linda
Briskin & Margaret McPhail, Feminist Organizing for Change: The Contemporary Women’s
Movement in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1988); Peta Tancred-Sheriff, ed., Feminist
Research: Prospect and Retrospect (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1988); Sandra
Burt, Lorraine Code & Lindsay Dorney, eds., Changing Patterns: Women in Canada (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1988); Constance Backhouse & David H. Flaherty, Challenging Times:
The Women’s Movement in Canada and the United States (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 1992); Linda Carty, ed., And Still We Rise: Feminist Political Mobilizing in Contemporary
Canada (Toronto: Women’s Press, 1993); Gayle MacDonald, Rachel L. Osborne & Charles C.
Smith, eds., Feminism, Law, Inclusion: Intersectionality in Action (Toronto: Sumach Press, 2005);
Judy Rebick, Ten Thousand Roses: The Making of a Feminist Revolution (Toronto: Penguin, 2005).
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founded feminist legal organizations to advocate for women’s equality
and to offer direct services to women clients. They championed concepts
such as employment equity, demanding systemic changes within the
legal profession and more broadly throughout society. Much of this must
have seemed risky, even foolhardy, to many of the more senior women
lawyers. More research needs to be done on the complex relationships
between the two groups, but anecdotal evidence suggests some serious
parting of the ways.11 Occasionally there was rapprochement, but
typically only when discussions moved beyond matters of strategy into
core assumptions about gender, because both groups believed that it was
essential that women succeed in law. There was little disagreement about
the fundamental objectives, but deeply-rooted dissension over how best
to move forward toward those goals.
In terms of chronology, Justice Wilson’s career marks her as one of
the generation of early women lawyers. She entered law at a time when
women represented fewer than five per cent of the profession.12 She
enrolled at Dalhousie Law School in 1954, was called to the bar in 1958,
and began work with the Osler’s law firm in Toronto in 1959.13 Yet her
appointment as the first female judge of the Supreme Court of Canada
was, in part, a response to the growing influence of feminism, and
heralded by feminists within and outside of law as a cause for rejoicing.14
Reflecting on this some years later, Justice Wilson stated:
When I was appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada in the Spring of
1982, a great many women from all across the country telephoned,
cabled or wrote to me rejoicing in my appointment. “Now,” they said,
“we are represented on Canada’s highest court. This is the beginning of
a new era for women.” So why was I not rejoicing? Why did I not
share the tremendous confidence of these women? First came the
11
In 1980, Leah Cohen and I were compiling research on sexual harassment within the
legal profession, and I interviewed a senior Vancouver lawyer, Mary Southin, to ask her views. She
objected to the very topic, stating, “That’s like something out of a book,” and adding that lawyers
were “fair and honourable professionally”. She could not believe that a male lawyer might twin his
unwelcome advances with threats of reprisals. “It staggers the imagination,” was her response. I
realize in retrospect that the resulting article, published in the Canadian Lawyer magazine (February
1980) at 16-20, which juxtaposed her dismissive comments with details of egregious incidents of
sexual abuse and humiliation, must have struck her as the height of folly. Informal conversations
with Laura Legge, the first woman to become Treasurer of the Law Society of Upper Canada,
indicate that of all the challenges she faced in her illustrious career, it was the behaviour of feminist
lawyers that most upset her.
12
See Survey of Higher Education and Universities, supra, note 8.
13
For dates, see Judging Bertha Wilson, supra, note 1, chapters 3 and 4.
14
Id., at 125.
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realization that no one could live up to the expectations of my wellwishers.15

It was Justice Wilson’s fate to have reached the zenith of her career
at a time when feminist voices had reached an unprecedented strength
within law. Her tenure on the Supreme Court of Canada and her work as
chair of the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) Task Force on Gender
Equality in the Legal Profession, with its final report released in 1993,
brought her squarely into the feminist legal movement and the flowering
of second wave feminism. It was a complicated juxtaposition.

III. BERTHA WILSON’S OWN EXPERIENCE OF GENDER IN LAW
Even a cursory reading of Justice Wilson’s biography provides
incontrovertible evidence that her legal career was greatly influenced by
her gender. Justice Wilson experienced social exclusion as one of
Dalhousie’s early women law students, none of whom were welcome in
the university common room or the local fishermen’s tavern where the
other students lingered. Dalhousie Law Dean Horace Read told Justice
Wilson she should “just go home and take up crocheting”, and actively
discouraged her from accepting a scholarship to do graduate legal
studies at Harvard because there would “never be women academics
teaching in law schools”.16
It was difficult for women to find articles, and when she became the
first female hired at Osler’s, she was warned that she could not stay
permanently. She did stay, but Osler’s made her wait for nine years
before bestowing partnership, in a milieu in which males were often
given partnership in five. At first, she was not allowed to travel with
male lawyers because of the potential for gossip. A woman who would
have made a first-rate courtroom lawyer, she was not permitted to do
litigation. Instead, she carved out a different path within the firm, as a
“lawyer’s lawyer”, developing a separate legal research department (at
the time an entirely new concept in Canadian legal culture), to conduct
research on other lawyer’s files. Despite 16 years at the firm, she was
never made senior partner or appointed to the senior management
committee.17
15
Bertha Wilson, “Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?” (1990) 28 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 507.
16
Judging Bertha Wilson, supra, note 1, at 38-49.
17
Id., at 57-64.
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Her appointment to the courts sparked serious resistance from several
judges and she found herself isolated from informal judicial discussions in
ways that marginalized her influence. Fanatical anti-choice proponents
deluged Justice Wilson with hostile letters during her constitutional rulings
on abortion, with comments so hateful that her staff at the court were too
frightened to open the mail. Anti-feminist responses to the CBA Task
Force were virulent and directed at Justice Wilson personally, causing her
great anxiety and concern.18
Anderson mentions these difficulties, but stresses that Justice Wilson
“did not nurture any feminist resentments”, and that she had “no desire
to assert herself as equal in the sense of being identical with the more
prominent male lawyers”. While at Osler’s, Justice Wilson tried to make
her marginalization work positively for her, and seemed to relish her role
as the creator of an innovative research department, viewing the
minimum contact with clients and freedom from rainmaking
responsibilities as a plus. Anderson also stresses that Justice Wilson was
“prepared to accommodate ... and learn from” the male judges who
spurned her.19 Reflecting upon her appointment as the first woman on the
Ontario Court of Appeal in 1976, Justice Wilson was quoted as
emphasizing the need to approach the male-dominant world of law with
caution:
I don’t believe that when I went on the court that the male judges took
it for granted that I was going to be able to do the job. I think, maybe,
that the view was contrary. So, to go on there and start throwing your
weight around when you were, in their eyes, a novice … Well, you
have to gain acceptance through your ability first and they will listen to
you … A lot of women, I think, are of the view that as soon as you get
into a group, you can start trying to change things. I don’t think it
works. I think you have to go through this process of proving yourself
first.20

Throughout her investigations into the status of women in the
profession as part of the CBA Task Force on Gender Equality, Justice
Wilson maintained that she personally had encountered “only isolated
instances of discrimination” perpetrated by a few individuals “during all
her years in the legal profession”. She was apparently shocked and taken
18

Id., at 94, 128, 150-64, 346-50.
Id., at 57, 64, 94.
20
Susan Lightstone, “Bertha Wilson: A Personal View of Women and the Law” (1998) 2
(7) National 14.
19
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aback at the widespread reporting of sexism that women lawyers and
judges divulged to the Task Force. Her experience on the Task Force
brought her smack up against the changes that the new cohort of feminist
lawyers were effecting. They were no longer willing to discount and
ignore sexist treatment, and they felt safe reporting their problems to
Justice Wilson’s Task Force, because they perceived the female Supreme
Court justice as sympathetic and supportive, even as a fellow feminist.21
For Justice Wilson, “the whole experience became enormously painful”.
In fact, Anderson suggests that it was not until after Justice Wilson
released her Report, and felt the backlash that greeted the revelations
therein, that she felt “her first unequivocal and deeply personal
experience of gender discrimination”.22
Despite the multiple manifestations of differential gender-based
treatment that Justice Wilson experienced throughout her career, her
biographer reports that Justice Wilson believed she had never been
subjected to “persistent or systemic discrimination”.23 It is a conclusion
that seems surprising, but it is a perspective that would have accorded
with the public commentary of many of the women lawyers and judges
of her generation. In the decades in which Justice Wilson launched her
career, accommodation was the watchword. During her formative years
in law, “nurturing feminist resentments” would have been unproductive,
and asserting a position of formal equality quite likely doomed to failure.
Instead, Justice Wilson, like others of her generation, cautiously adopted
strategies of responding to male exclusion and hostility with politeness
and persistence, and the pursuit of somewhat different career trajectory
paths.
It was a philosophy of life she brought forward into the 1970s, when
the new cohort of feminist lawyers was demanding radical change. Their
jubilance over Justice Wilson’s appointment to the Supreme Court
21

Judging Bertha Wilson, supra, note 1, at 349-50. The Task Force Report suggests that
women judges, who might have been reluctant to divulge information about sexist treatment
publicly, felt confident in replying to the Task Force, knowing that Justice Wilson would be the only
one to review their comments: Touchstones for Change: Equality, Diversity and Accountability, A
Report on Gender Equality in the Legal Profession (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, August
1993), at 192-94 [hereinafter “Touchstones for Change”]. The contrast between their trust in Justice
Wilson and their distrust of Chief Justice Lamer was well illustrated after the revelations of sexist
mistreatment of female judges by their male colleagues became public. Chief Justice Lamer sought
to identify the names of victims and culprits, and wrote to every federally appointed judge
demanding details about unequal treatment. He received no replies. Judging Bertha Wilson, id., at
349.
22
Judging Bertha Wilson, id.
23
Id.
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apparently made her uneasy, as must have their wish to claim her as a
fellow-traveller within the wider feminist movement. And some
feminists were equally uneasy over Justice Wilson’s appointment,
knowing that the “first” women into male-dominant preserves were
generally chosen precisely for their accommodating philosophies. Some
even worried privately that the first female Supreme Court justice might
issue anti-feminist judgments, deflating any argument that an all-male
bench needed the presence of women to give voice to real gender
equality.24
Furthermore, the feminist movement was never a monolithic or
homogeneous phenomenon, as socialist feminists, radical feminists,
liberal feminists and others struggled to define the goals and strategies of
the new movement. It was sometimes difficult to know what “feminism”
was, and many women expressed a sense of hesitation or uncertainty
about identifying as feminist because they were not sure whether they
qualified. As indicative of this, one woman with whom I was discussing
this article quipped: “I wanted to ask: ‘Do you have to have a T-shirt and
badge?’”25 When feminists began to engage in fractious debates over
how to construct and delineate feminist principles, confusion reigned in
many circles as women tried to decide whether they measured up to the
movement’s demands.
Still others understood “feminism” and “feminists” to be distinctly
negative terms. In the eyes of many, feminism became the “F word”.26
Women who wished to assert support for concepts such as equal pay and
other doctrines of equality would commonly begin their discussions by
saying “I’m not a feminist but …”. Justice Bertha Wilson’s biographer
certainly would agree. She uses descriptions of feminism that emphasize
24

I admit to harbouring some concerns on this point, as did others with whom I discussed
the matter. Christine Boyle made a similar point in her article, “Sexual Assault and the Feminist
Judge” (1985) 1 C.J.W.L. 93, at 94, in which she suggested that a feminist might have ethical
objections to accepting an appointment to the bench, since as a judge she would be restricted to
mere reformism, or would find herself “giving credibility to a morally bankrupt system”. On the
tendency to select women with male perspectives for elevation to positions of power, see generally
Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987) and
Towards a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).
25
I am indebted to Carolyn Bennett, M.P. for this wonderful quote.
26
One of the leaders of the post 1970s cohort, Ottawa lawyer Shirley Greenberg, noted that
“feminists were reviled”. She did so on the occasion of receiving an award as an “exceptional
woman” from the Hadassah-WIZO, adding: “I really feel that anything I do, or have done, is really
because of my feminist convictions and my desire to advance the cause of women. Feminists have
been reviled for decades, really, and it’s nice to see some are getting some positive recognition.”
Jennifer Campbell, “Shirley Greenberg Receives Award for Efforts on Behalf of Women” Ottawa
Citizen, October 24, 2007, at B3.
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confrontational tactics and rigidity, and appears to have understood
feminism as incorporating a pro-female, anti-male “bias”. To the extent
that Bertha Wilson consciously or unconsciously accepted these
characterizations, this might explain her rejection of the label. She may
also have felt that if she publicly identified as a feminist, it would have
attracted further dangerous backlash. She may have believed that
claiming to be feminist was unwise, even impolite. Justice Bertha
Wilson was not of the generation that marched in women-only “Take
Back the Night” marches, or debated the transformative politics of
radical lesbian separatism. The practices and strategies that were
identified with the “feminist revolution” may have struck her as
unfamiliar and out of character with her own world.

IV. WRITTEN EVIDENCE OF BERTHA WILSON’S
PERCEPTIONS OF FEMINISM
Curiously, given her reluctance to identify as a feminist, the written
record suggests that Justice Wilson did not fully adopt unfair stereotyped
and pejorative understandings of feminism. To the contrary, she
embraced a broad and inclusive definition. The best evidence of this is
found in Touchstones for Change: Equality, Diversity and Accountability,
the Report on Gender Equality in the Legal Profession, issued by the
CBA Task Force that Justice Wilson chaired in 1993. Noting that gender
discrimination was “more pronounced for female lawyers who bring a
feminist perspective to their work”, her Report explained:
There are many misconceptions about the nature of feminism which are
used to impugn the credibility of those who give voice to a feminist
perspective. It is essential to recognize that everyone operates under a
value system which shapes what they see and how they interpret what
they see. Feminism is only one of these perspectives. The following
definition of “feminism” may help to dispel some of the misconceptions:
A feminist is a person who believes women and men should
be equal participants in society regardless of race, ethnic
origin, economic background, gender, sexual orientation, or
disability. A feminist believes women have not yet achieved
equality in our society and that steps should be taken to
correct this situation. Lastly, a feminist believes the world
should be a comfortable place for women, men and children,
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free of stereotypes and myths which restrict the roles each
assumes.27

This is a wide-ranging and inclusive definition of feminism, one that
appears to run directly counter to most or all of the negative qualities
described above. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that many people would
have difficulty agreeing to sign on to this version of feminist politic.
Justice Bertha Wilson’s Task Force Report also recognized the
hostility that surrounded feminism, and expressed concern over the
implications of this within the legal setting. It recounted a “disturbing
level of anti-feminism” present in some law schools. Citing a survey at
the University of New Brunswick, the Task Force noted that “about half
of the women and a third of the men reported often hearing other
students express derogatory or sexist comments about feminists”, and
that “a substantial percentage of women had heard professors make
derogatory or sexist comments about feminists”. In response, the Task
Force recommended that law schools establish “on-going support
programs to address the needs of students threatened by the poisoned
environment”.28
In addition, the Report documented concerns expressed by young
female judges. Justice Wilson’s Task Force Report continued:
Some of the younger women appointed were asked if they were
feminists and told that feminists were unsuited for the judicial role
because of their radical and biased views. Some were even told that
feminism automatically disqualified them from sitting on cases
involving sexual assault because of their anti-male prejudice! [The
male members of the court] were simply applying their own
preconceived ideas and exhibiting a mindset which clearly was not
based on rational evidence but on myths and stereotypes accepted and
applied without critical or constructive thought.
.....
Those women judges were usually younger, recently appointed, and
perceived by their male colleagues to be “radical feminists.” As has
been pointed out by many writers on gender issues, a “radical feminist”
in the eyes of some men may simply be a woman who believes in
equality, publicly asserts that belief and attempts to achieve it. Because
the existing norm has always been and still is the norm of inequality,
27
Touchstones for Change, supra, note 21, at 11, quoting the Law Society of British
Columbia, Gender Equality in the Justice System, vol. 1, at 1-3.
28
Id., at 33, 37.
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equality must inevitably seem radical to some in that it is a total
rejection of inequality. It does, indeed, go to the very “root” of it!29

The Report left no doubt where it stood on this alleged bias matter:
“There would appear to be no justification at all for denying women
judges the opportunity to sit on sexual assault cases or any other case in
which women have been victimized by men.”30 The Task Force
recommended that “Chief Justices and Chief Judges treat women judges
on their court fairly in the assignment or allocation of work.”31
So we are left with the dilemma of a woman who defined feminism
in terms that would seem to make it almost impossible for egalitarianminded individuals to disavow, who objected to the “anti-feminist”
actions of those who defined feminism pejoratively, but who still would
not self-identify as a feminist.

V. CHARACTERISTICS OF A FEMINIST JUDGE
Is it possible to claim that a woman judge who did not self-identify
as a feminist did in fact utilize and adopt feminist principles? Perhaps
the first issue to clarify here is how we would define feminist judging.
Christine Boyle was one of the first scholars to attempt to explore this
complex question. Recognizing that feminism is not monolithic, and that
differences within feminist theory might result in different responses to
gender-related questions, she nevertheless argued that a feminist judge
would focus critical attention on the matter of gender. She suggested that
a feminist judge would not use gender neutral analysis when considering
gender specific issues, would attempt to take into account women’s as
well as men’s interests, and would not allow male interests to
“masquerade” as human interests.32 Michelle Boivin has argued that a
feminist judge would seek to improve women’s lives while paying
attention to the diversity of women’s experiences, and the wider
contextual and surrounding circumstances.33 In a fascinating, as yet
unpublished paper, Rosemary Hunter has begun to explore the many
ways feminism might influence judges as they negotiate court processes,
29
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determine the outcome of cases, give reasons for their decisions, and
engage in extra-curricular activities in areas such as law reform, public
speaking and education, and mentoring of other women judges and
lawyers.34
Based upon these parameters, there is much in Bertha Wilson’s
career that appears to be demonstrably feminist. To begin with
fundamentals, within her domestic home life she and her husband John,
a United Church minister, struck an egalitarian bargain in which
household responsibilities were shared between the spouses. When
Justice Wilson first commenced her legal studies and throughout her
career, she did the housecleaning, while John handled the “grocery
shopping and all of the cooking”. When she spoke to young female law
students and lawyers, Justice Wilson urged them to strike similar
arrangements with their own domestic partners, stressing that without
equality at home, there was little prospect of career advancement. She
was “brutally frank” in warning women against partners “who were not
prepared to treat them with equal respect for their career aspirations and
equal sharing of domestic responsibilities”. Break it off “sooner rather
than later” was her strict admonishment.35 Equally impressive, a woman
without children of her own, she was one of the chief architects of
Osler’s first maternity leave policy, an innovation she championed on
behalf of the women who followed her into the firm as associates and
partners in the early 1970s.36
Other scholars have provided much more expert analysis of Justice
Wilson’s judicial opinions than I am able to do here, so I will only
briefly flag several key Supreme Court of Canada decisions that seem to
highlight feminist characteristics. Her 1979 Court of Appeal decision in
Bhadauria v. Seneca College was a trail-blazing ruling that would have
recognized a new common law tort of discrimination.37 Had it not been
later overruled by the Supreme Court of Canada, the landscape of human
rights law would have been completely transformed, with great potential
for an expansion of equality principles based on gender, race, sexual
orientation and disability. Her 1990 Supreme Court of Canada decision
in Lavallee dramatically refashioned the Canadian law of self-defence
34
Rosemary Hunter, “What (or Who) is a Feminist Judge?” Paper presented at the Annual
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from its previously masculinist perspective, to take greater account of
the gendered circumstances of battered women.38 Her 1988 Morgentaler
decision struck down provisions in the Criminal Code39 that made it an
offence to procure an abortion, in a ruling that emphasized the gendered
distinctions involved in reproduction:
It is probably impossible for a man to respond even imaginatively to
such a dilemma not just because it is outside the realm of his personal
experience (although this is, of course, the case) but because he can
relate to it only by objectifying it, thereby eliminating the subjective
elements of the female psyche which are at the heart of the dilemma.40

Over time, the force of Justice Wilson’s personality was such that
she was able to nudge some of the most influential judges on the
Supreme Court of Canada to begin rethinking judicial perspectives on
gender equality. Chief Justice Brian Dickson reportedly admired her
efforts to reform common law to reflect changes in community values
with respect to marriage and divorce in the Becker v. Pettkus case.41 And
although his first impressions of the Lavallee case were opposite to those
of Justice Wilson’s, she convinced him to transform his opinion. His
biographers note that “Lavallee demonstrates Dickson’s growing
attachment to Wilson’s equality views and his receptivity to her feminist
perspective, which re-examined traditional legal doctrines in light of
their effect on women.”42 Chief Justice Brian Dickson apparently once
said that everything he knew about women’s rights, he learned from
Justice Bertha Wilson.43
Her extra-curricular activities off the bench offer additional evidence
of risk-taking behaviour to publicly expose conduct that was sexist. In
1989, Justice Wilson gave a lecture at the Canadian Institute for
Advanced Legal Studies at Cambridge University in England, and
participated in a panel discussion with U.S. Supreme Court judge Sandra
Day O’Connor and Lord Ackner of the British House of Lords. During
38
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the lunch that preceded the lecture, Justice Wilson apparently asked Lord
Ackner why no woman had ever been appointed to the House of Lords.
His unflaggingly direct reply: “No woman had ever been qualified.”
When the topic of women on the bench was raised during the public
lecture that followed, Justice Wilson repeated Lord Ackner’s response,
causing him to explode in fury, and to claim that his remarks at lunch
had been “privileged”. Interrupted in mid-sentence, Justice Wilson
insisted that she be allowed to complete her retelling of Ackner’s
comments, a courageous act that reportedly caused some ruffled feathers
and shocked reaction.44
Other public speeches reveal additional evidence of feminist
perspectives. One of the most significant was the speech Justice Wilson
gave at Osgoode Hall Law School in 1990, titled “Will Women Judges
Really Make a Difference?”45 The public lecture came at a particularly
fractious time at the school, as final settlement negotiations were still
being worked out over the human rights complaint that more than 120
women lawyers, law professors and law students had brought against
Osgoode for its failure to appoint a feminist associate dean, Mary Jane
Mossman, to the more powerful decanal position.46 In her remarks,
Justice Wilson quoted research from sociologist Norma Wikler, that
offered “overwhelming evidence that gender-based myths, biases, and
stereotypes [were] deeply embedded in the attitudes of many male
judges, as well as in the law itself”, and that “gender difference” was a
“significant factor in judicial decision-making”.47 She noted that
Canadian feminist scholars had advanced two propositions: “One, that
women view the world and what goes on in it from a different
perspective from men; and two, that women judges, by bringing that
perspective to bear on the cases they hear, can play a major role in
introducing judicial neutrality and impartiality into the justice system.”48
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Justice Wilson noted that in some areas of the law, “a distinctively
male perspective” was “clearly discernible” and that this had resulted in
“legal principles that are not fundamentally sound”, adding: “Some
aspects of the criminal law in particular cry out for change; they are
based on presuppositions about the nature of women and women’s
sexuality that, in this day and age, are little short of ludicrous.”49 Her
concluding words were: “If women lawyers and women judges through
their differing perspectives on life can bring a new humanity to bear on
the decision-making process, perhaps they will make a difference.
Perhaps they will succeed in infusing the law with an understanding of
what it means to be fully human.”50 The press coverage of the speech
described the event as “electrifying”.51 The furor prompted the antifeminist, conservative REAL women’s organization to launch a
complaint against Justice Wilson, alleging that she was unfit to sit as a
judge because of her feminist bias.52
Shortly after her retirement, in 1991 Justice Wilson was appointed to
chair the CBA Gender Equality Task Force. The resulting report was
described by Justice Wilson’s biographer as being “as much of a
bombshell” as the Women Judges and Difference speech one year
earlier.53 Feminist analysis is laced throughout the 1993 Report. On the
matter of curriculum development in legal education, the Report noted:
“The principle of equality makes it clear that: a male perspective is not
neutral; a white perspective is not neutral; a heterosexual perspective is
not neutral; and so on”, adding: “[L]egal education must include a
diversity of approaches to the law that reflect more than just one or two
perspectives.”54 On the topic of judicial education, the Report noted that
it was “regrettable that when Canada followed the United States’ lead in
attempting to probe the degree of gender bias in its judiciary, the
Canadian judiciary remained generally aloof from the process and did
not provide the kind of leadership and support that many of the Chief
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Justices in the United States provided.”55 In response, the Report
endorsed “compulsory training for judges, in both gender and racial
issues”.56
In another example of risk-taking associated with this Report, Justice
Wilson conducted a survey of the approximately 200 female judges in
Canada, asking them whether they had ever personally experienced
discrimination from their judicial colleagues. Recognizing the sensitivity
of the question, Justice Wilson promised that she would be the only
person to review the survey responses, that she would destroy the raw
data as soon as these were summarized, and that she would protect the
anonymity of all the participants. One hundred and thirty-two women
responded. Fifty-eight reported having personally experienced discrimination on the bench. A number reported serious sexual harassment,
identifying some offenders “well known for their proclivity in this
direction”, and describing particularly egregious behaviour at judicial
conferences where “alcohol is served”. All of this was duly documented
in Justice Wilson’s final Report.57
The Report’s release caused great controversy, upsetting Chief
Justice Lamer and British Columbia’s Chief Justice McEachern, both of
whom condemned Justice Wilson’s findings. Chief Justice Lamer
insisted that Justice Wilson disclose which judges had complained, and
who they had identified as culprits. He was so incensed that he
personally wrote to every federally appointed judge to invite them to
report to him any “bias or unequal treatment at the hands of judges”. Not
surprisingly, there were no takers on this invitation. Chief Justice
McEachern demanded that Justice Wilson disaggregate the statistical
results, so that he could demonstrate that there were no problems in
British Columbia. Some members of the CBA insisted that if Justice
Wilson would not reveal her sources, all of her evidence of
discrimination was suspect. Justice Wilson responded that she had given
her word that the participants would not be identified, and resisted all
demands. She stood by her evidence, her analysis and her conclusions.58
In its assessment of substantive law, the Report articulated how
central gender was to the development of legal rules and procedures:
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The law as it has evolved over the centuries was made by men and for
men. This recognition has sparked a great deal of interest among
feminist lawyers and there is now a sizeable body of scholarship in
both Canada and the United States on the extent to which an
exclusively male perspective has conditioned the law and, in effect,
suffused it with gender bias. Men have traditionally, and many still
currently, view a male perspective as gender neutral. Yet one only has
to think for a moment to appreciate that gender neutrality is a myth. [It
is] very timely for the legal profession to review established legal
principles from a female perspective, not because a female perspective
is any more neutral than a male one, but because it is just possible that
the combined perspectives might lead to a better, more relevant and
more humane legal system.59

Despite the reference to “humane” as the rationale of a just legal
system, this goes far beyond a philosophy of humanism, clarifying that
there is no such thing as gender neutrality. Justice Wilson’s Report
insists that the male assumptions that underlie legal rules must be
displaced, and that justice requires the full inclusion of female
perspectives and experiences. This fits squarely within her wide-ranging
and inclusive definition of feminism, and makes it difficult to argue that
feminist principles are not deeply embedded in the Report’s findings and
recommendations. Her work with the CBA Task Force on Gender
Equality suggests that there were certainly times when Justice Wilson
spoke as a feminist and for the feminist movement.

VI. CONCLUSION
Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé recalls that she once confronted
Justice Wilson with this query: “You say you’re not a feminist, but I
think you’re the greatest feminist of all.” According to Justice
L’Heureux-Dubé, her colleague was silent; Justice Bertha Wilson did
not answer the implied question.60 The only comment I have been able to
find that suggests that Justice Wilson was not as averse to the feminist
label as we may suppose was published in a 1985 magazine article.
Sandra Gwyn, a reporter for Saturday Night, wrote that Justice Wilson
considered herself “a moderate feminist” while on the Court.61
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Justice Wilson stood as a bridge between the former generations and
the incoming cohort. Her character was formed in an era that erased
gender and sought accommodation, and her subsequent career placed her
squarely within the hotbed of feminist demands for revolutionary
change.
It would undoubtedly have been easier for the first female Supreme
Court judge to avoid the controversy associated with her many genderfocused judgments, the “Women Judges and Difference” lecture, and the
CBA Task Force. Yet Justice Wilson’s career contains much that
appears to be demonstrably influenced by feminism. She went further
than many anticipated she might have, and became an icon for the young
women lawyers who so desperately needed champions for equality in
powerful places. Her uneasiness over the label “feminist” does not
detract from the extraordinary influence she wielded with judicial
decisions, public pronouncements, mentoring, and public policy reform
that created marked inroads for women in law.
Is it disrespectful to claim Justice Wilson as a “feminist judge” when
she herself apparently refused to so identify? Some will undoubtedly
think so. Others might argue that had more women in influential
positions publicly taken up the title “feminist”, it would have served to
minimize the vituperative hostility and unfair maligning of feminism, to
further isolate those who dismissed feminism as “the F word”. For me, it
is certainly reason for sadness that a towering figure such as Justice
Wilson was so reluctant to self-identify. We must ask ourselves how
misconceived must be the movement which has contributed so much to
the advancement of equality, if women such as Justice Wilson sought to
separate themselves from it. The female judge who wrote so distinctly as
a woman when she proclaimed the constitutional right to abortion, who
brought to Canadian law a distinctly gendered sensitivity to womanbattering, who tried (and failed) to establish a new tort of discrimination,
is someone who I would have hoped would have claimed the label of
feminism with heart and soul.
Still others might argue that it is equally disrespectful to those who
took the label “feminist”, with all the backlash that provoked, to count
Justice Wilson among their movement’s leaders. That said, Justice
Wilson’s advancement of legal thinking about equality and
discrimination constituted a life contribution that outstripped most of the
jurists who had gone before. For litigants and litigators seeking access to
a hitherto unreceptive, closed legal system, she opened vistas of
opportunity, imagination and hope. In the end, I have come to the
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conclusion that it would be a mark of the greatest respect to identify
Justice Bertha Wilson as a feminist, both as a tribute to her legacy and as
a tribute to the feminist movement itself.

